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GRADUATED GROSS SAws TAx. - A revenue measure on gross retail sales, not on gross collections from vendees, imposed a tax of
one-twentieth of one per cent. on all sales exceeding $400,000 in
amount but not exceeding $500,000, and two-twentieths of one per
cent. on all sales exceeding $500,000 but not exceeding $600,000.
The rate increased one-twentieth of one per cent. on each additional $100,000 of sales between $400,000 and $1,000,000 inclusive
until in the last bracket, or sales exceeding $900,000 but less than
$1,000,000, in amount, the rate was seventeen-twentieths of one
per 'cent. Held, in injunction proceedings to prevent collection,
that the basis for classification was arbitrary and in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Three justices dissented. Stewart
Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis.'
The Supreme Court recently held that a graduated classification of business by the number of stores 2 for license tax purposes
is not in violation of the equal protection of laws clause. Any
classification by graduation is in a degree arbitrary.' Whether
the classification comes within the ban of the Constitution is determined by the degree of the arbitrariness.4 In matters of
taxation the courts recognize a broader power of classification
than elsewhere.5 The limits of this power are only vaguely
established. In a case somewhat similar to the principal case a
license fee, not percentage, on the privilege of doing business, determined by the amount of sales, was held not to be repugnant to
the Constitution." This case differs from the principal case only
in that in the latter the rate of tax increased with each graduated
unit. Possibly because one gets a windfall when he inherits, progressive rates of taxation increasing with the amount of the gift
and applying to the entire gift, which imposed a three per cent.
tax on a legacy of $10,000 leaving the legatee $9,700 and a four
per cent. tax on a legacy of $10,001 leaving the legatee $9,600.96
were held not to be of the banned degree. 7 The Supreme Court
'Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 55 S. Ct. 525 (U. S. 1935).
2 FOx v. Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey, 55 S. Ct. 333 (U. S. 1935).
3 (1931) 37 W. VA. L. Q. 220.
4 Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230, 46 S. Ct. 260 (1926).
5 Citizens' Telephone Co. v. Fuller, 229 U. S. 322, 33 S. Ct. 837 (1913).
a Clark v. Titusville, 184 U. S. 329, 22 S. Ct. 382 .(1902).
7 Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 18 S. Ct. 594
(1898); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 20 S. Ct. 747 (1900).
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has decided that the exigencies of trade incident to chain store distribution justify classification of chain stores for taxation at the
same rate as that applicable to single store ownership but graduated upward on each additional store as the total number of units
under one ownership increases." Theatres charging higher admission may be charged higher license tax fees, even though it is
shown that they have less revenue than theatres charging smaller
admission fees and subject to less tax.' In a case, seemingly more
stringent than the principal case, in which a graduated tax on
salmon canneries of five cents per case on all cases in excess of
10,000 and not more than 25,000 and an increase per case on each
graduated level was held to be within the taxing power of the legislature.""
The law does not require exact equality of taxation. It only
requires that the law imposing it shall operate on all alike under
the same circumstances. A tax on a group of stores of six or more
in number exempting a less number operated under one ownership
is arbitrary," but it has been decided that a higher license tax on
each store over one operated by the same firm is not arbitrary"
because a chain of stores has economic advantages over the
operation of a single store. It has been held that there is no reason for the existence, in a tax measure, of a conclusive presumption
that all gifts made within six years from the time of the death of
th6 donor were made in contemplation of death and the property
made subject to the tax. This was held to be an arbitrary discrimination between gifts made within that period and gifts made
13
in a longer period.
A tax measure on gross receipts of a corporation in the general
taxicab business was held to be discriminatory because it did not
include individuals and partnerships in the same business. 4 A tax
on the privilege of recordation of 20c for each $100 of value secured by mortgages of the debt falling due in more than five years
but not applying to recordation of securities for debts due in less
than five years is arbitrary and the distinction made without

8 State Board of Tax Com'rs v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 51 S. Ct. 540 (1931);
Lewis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U. S. 517, 53 S. Ct. 481 (1933).
9 Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U. S. 61, 33 S. Ct. 441 (1913).
10 Pacific American Fisheries v. Alaska, 269 U. S. 269, 46 S. Ct. 110 (1925).
13 Hoge v. Ward, 109 W. Va. 515, 155 S. E. 838 (1930).
12 Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Maxwell, 199 N. C. 433, 154 S. E.
838 (1930).

13 Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, supra n. 4.
14 Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389, 48 S. Ct. 553 (1928).
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reasonable ground.', But it has been decided that exemption of
pipe lines of less than ten miles length from a tax measure 0 and
exemption of farmers and planters, who grind and refine their
own sugar and molasses, from a tax measure by the business of
sugar refining is not within the banned degree of discrimination.' 7
The contention of the dissenting justices in the principal case,
that the prevailing opinion holds a tax on gross sales if laid upon
a graduated basis is always a denial of equal protection, seems to
be well-founded. The court had been committed to the doctrine
that a tax on gross sales on a graduated basis did not deny equal
protection. The arbitrariness of graduation must be a matter of
degree. The tax in the principal case would never equal one per
cent. of the gross sales. The tax approved by the Supreme Court
on salmon fisheries was limited to 25c per case in the higher
bracket. In that case, too, the burden of taxation was higher on
those who produced more. It is suggested that there is no sound
basis for the narrow limits marked out in the prevailing opinion
of the principal case.
-- JOHiN L. DETCH.

INSURANCE -

EFFECT OF LEGAL EXEcuTION OF INSURED Fou

CRum. - Defendant issued an insurance policy to C, promising
to pay the amount of the policy upon receiving proof of the death
of the insured. There was no stated exception of the risk of death
by execution. Held, public policy does not bar recovery on such
a policy by plaintiff, the beneficiary, where the insured was legally
executed for murder. Corey v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co.'
Leading in the opposite result is the Supreme Court of the
United States, which has held, where the insured was executed for
murder, that: "There is an implied obligation on his part to do
nothing to wrongfully accelerate the maturity of the policy," and
that it would be against public policy to enforce the contract under
such circumstances. 2 The instant holding, generally regarded as
Louisville Gas Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32, 48 S. Ct. 423 (1928).
Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, 87 W. Va. 396, 105 S. E. 506 (1920).
17 Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 89, 21 S. Ct. 43 (1900).
'5
's

'178 S. E. 525 (W. Va. 1935). As to the Incontestable clause precluding a
defense based upon public policy, see (1925) 35 A. L. R. 1491.
2 Burt v. Union Central Life Insurance Co., 187 U. S. 362, 23 S. Ct. 139
(1902). The result in this case is weakened by the fact that plaintiff's most
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